The Legal Character of the Right to
Explore and Exploit the Natural
Resources of the Continental Shelf
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Internationallaw, both through treaty and customary usage, con-

firms each coastal state's right to explore and exploit the natural
resources of its continental shelf. Little attention, however, has
been paid to the legal characterizationof these rights. This paper

discusses the need for such characterizationand reviews the nature of analogousonshore mineral rights. From an examination of

the negotiations leading to the final wording of the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf and the subsequent conduct of

nations, the conclusion is drawn that coastal states enjoy real
property rights in the minerals in situ of the continental shelf.
THE NEED FOR CHARACTERIZATION

In order to effectively administer its continental shelf rights, a
coastal state must be able to define the nature of those rights. A
state may wish, for instance, to dispose of offshore mineral rights by
grant or lease and require those dispositions to be registered in a
designated land registry. Such a system will produce confusion and
uncertainty if the rights of the state under international law are limited to the exercise of legislative powers and do not extend to any
interest in the subsurface minerals until they are reduced to possession. A domestic natural resources policy will be either vague or in*
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consistent with international law unless the characterizations of the
international rights are known.
Several nations have enacted vague internal legislation which does
little more than confer on developers of continental shelf natural resources whatever rights belong to the country under international
law.' The uncertain nature of the exploration and exploitation rights
thus descend another level to the resource companies, and it is at this
level that practical concerns of the nature of the rights are heightened. Lenders to resource developers may require the right to explore and exploit as security for loans to establish, among other
things, production facilities, and will have to know in what form to
cast this security. Depending upon the nature of the developer's
rights, the security may take the form of either a real property mortgage or an assignment of contractual rights. However, internal legislation concerning mortgages may be inconsistent with legislation
concerning assignments, which may contain mutually exclusive requirements. For these reasons, different creditors or bankrupt holders of continental shelf exploration and exploitation rights may have
different priorities, depending on the nature of these rights.
Proper characterization of continental shelf rights acquired under
international law will also assist in treaty negotiations and in resolution of disputes among nations. Petroleum reservoirs straddling international boundaries provide perhaps the best illustration. Whether
one coastal state can legitimately complain if an adjacent state extracts all the oil or gas from a reservoir which extends to its continental shelf depends upon the nature and extent of the rights of that
state under international law. As will be seen, several treaties have
been negotiated between adjacent coastal states to deal with the orderly exploitation of common reservoirs. However, the same willingness to agree may not be present where common reservoirs straddle
the two hundred mile limit and where the Seabed Authority seeks to
enforce benefits for all mankind under the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention (1982 Convention).2
DOMESTIC CHARACTERIZATION

Interests in undisturbed hard minerals are treated as real property
interests throughout the common law countries. 3 Even though these
interests involve severance of the minerals from the soil and their
instantaneous metamorphosis into chattels,4 and even though the re1. See, e.g., Continental Shelf Act, 1964, ch. 29 (the United Kingdom).
2. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec.
10, 1982, U.N. Do.A/CONF.62/122.
3.

E.H. BURN, CHESHIRE'S MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 154 (13th ed.

1982).
4.

See, e.g., Atlantic Concrete v. MacDonald, 12 N.S.R.2d 179 (1975).
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moval and consumption of the minerals from the land is contrary to
the general basis of permanence and indestructibility upon which the
laws of real property depend, the intimate relationship between earth
and mineral has prompted the unchallenged characterization of hard
mineral interests as real.
The migratory nature of oil and gas has led to less certain legal
definition. Jurisprudential analogies to flowing water and wild animals have led certain courts to characterize oil and gas in situ as
incapable of ownership; 5 no title can be asserted until the hydrocarbons have been reduced to possession. The geological reality, however, is that hydrocarbons do not wander as freely as underground
rivers or as forest beasts; they are trapped in reservoirs under caps of
non-porous materials. Subject to one important qualification, the
courts in most of the United States, in Canada, and in England recognize full rights of ownership in oil and gas in situ.6 So long as the
reservoir is entirely contained within the boundaries of a single
owner, the hydrocarbons located therein will not migrate beneath the
lands of neighbors. Where a reservoir, however, is divided by a
boundary plane, the courts in jurisdictions which recognize in situ
ownership, acknowledge that an owner's rights are lost if the hydrocarbons migrate beyond his boundary plane to the lands of his neighbor. Each adjoining landowner of a common reservoir has the right
to produce hydrocarbons from that reservoir, and any hydrocarbons
recovered from a well on one owner's side become the property of
that owner. The judicial characterization of full rights of ownership
is therefore subject to the rule of capture.
The purpose of this treatment of on-land oil and gas in situ is to
examine those aspects which can be usefully compared with the
more limited rights a coastal state enjoys in its continental shelf.
There are only two basic land theories of ownership: the non-ownership theory arising from the flowing water and wild animal analogies
and the full ownership theory subject to the rule of capture, which is
based on a better understanding of petroleum geology. An oftenmentioned third theory, the so-called "qualified ownership" or Pennsylvania theory," is not a characterization of the rights which an oil
explorer receives under a standard oil and gas lease from the original
5. See Aronow v. Bishop, 86 P.R.2d 644 (1938).
6. See Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 146 Tex. 575, 210 S.W.2d 558 (1948); Bory v.
C.P.R., 1953 A.C. 217.
7. See cases cited supra note 6.
8. See Maclntyre, The Development of Oil and Gas Ownership Theory in Canada, 4 U.B.C. REv. 245 (1969).

owner. Courts in most jurisdictions have recognized that an oil and
gas lease is not anything like a lease in the traditional surface landlord-tenant relationship; instead it is a lesser qualified real property
right - a profit h prendre - which comprises the right to enter the

surface, to explore for, to sever from the realty, and to remove the
"leased" substances. The lessee's only rights to the hydrocarbons in
place are the rights to search for them and to remove them from the
realty. Title vests in the lessee only when the hydrocarbons are
brought under the possession and control of the lessee. Although not
a true case of primary ownership, this qualified theory will be seen to
bear certain similarities to rights of a coastal state to explore and
exploit the natural resources of its continental shelf.
THE DOCTRINE OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF

Much has been written on the development of the continental shelf
doctrine. While nations over the centuries have alternatively made
expansive and narrow claims to the seas beyond their coasts, the origin of the modern doctrine is often said to be the Truman Proclamation of 1945, by which President Truman proclaimed:
Having concern for the urgency of conserving and prudently utilizing its
natural resources, the Government of the United States regards the natural
resources of the subsoil and seabed of the continental shelf beneath the high
seas but contiguous to the coasts of the United States as appertaining to the

United States, subject to its jurisdiction and control.9

"Appurtenance" in the legal context is a word normally associated
with the incidents of real property,10 and it is used in the Truman
Proclamation to indicate that the basis for the claim of jurisdiction is
that the continental shelf is a prolongation of the land mass of the
United States. One of the recitals in the Proclamation makes this
clear: "[T]he continental shelf may be regarded as an extension of
the land mass of the contiguous nation and thus naturally appurtenant to it . .

.-.

The United States thus laid claim to an interest in the minerals in
place in the continental shelf - a real property interest.' 2 The Truman Proclamation carefully limits the claims to the natural re9. Proclamation No. 2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 12,303 (1945).
10. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 94 (5th ed. 1979).
II. Proclamation No. 2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 12,303 (1945).
12. Two statements concerning the resources of the subsoil and seabed of the continental shelf are made in the Truman Proclamation: the United States 1) regards them
as appertaining to the United States, and 2) regards them as subject to United States
control and jurisdiction.
The first statement means nothing more than a property claim; it makes ipso facto the
second statement superfluous. M.W. MOUTON, THE CONTINENTAL SHELF 276 (1952).
Mouton further states: "[I]n claiming that the resources of the subsoil appertain to the
United States, this State appropriates a part of the subsoil and in fact by exploiting these
resources acts as owner . . . ." Id. at 280.
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sources by expressly preserving the freedom of the high seas above

the continental shelf.
Following the lead of the United States, other countries promptly

declared entitlement to their continental shelves, but many claimed
vastly greater rights, including full sovereignty over the water col-

umn, the submarine areas, and the superjacent air space. 13 Consis-

tent with its position of more limited jurisdiction, the United States

advocated the use of the word "exclusive" to qualify the nature of
the right of a coastal state to explore and exploit its continental
14

shelf.

In supporting the use of the word "exclusive" rather than "sover-

eign" to establish the rights of a coastal state in its continental shelf
resources, the United States was not attempting to narrow the nature of the rights it had itself claimed in 1945; it was attempting to
ensure that the claims to the resources did not carry with them, by

implication or extension, any rights to the waters comprising the
high seas or the superjacent airspace.
Article 2 of the Geneva Convention on The Continental Shelf (the
Convention) forged a workable compromise:
1. The coastal State exercised over the continental shelf sovereign rights for
the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural resources.
2. The rights referred to in paragraph 1 of this article are exclusive in the
sense that if the coastal State does not explore the continental shelf or exploit its natural resources, no one may undertake these activities, or make a
claim to the continental shelf, without the express consent of the coastal
State.
13. See [1966] Andles de legslaci6n Argentina (Argentina's Law on Sovereignty
over Seas and Seabed of Dec. 29, 1966):
Article I: The sovereignty of the Argentine Nation extends to seas contiguous to
its territory out to a distance of two hundred marine miles ....
Article 2: The sovereignty of the Argentine Nation likewise extends to the seabed and subsoil of the submarine zones contiguous to its territory ....
Id.; see also Kreuger, The Background of the Doctrine of the ContinentalShelf and the
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 10 NAT. RESOURCES J. 442, 471 (1970).
14. It was well known, of course, that certain states desired that rights with
respect to the continental shelf should affect the legal status of the waters above
the shelf and the superjacent airspace. In that light, at least, it seemed desirable
to some states, including the United States, to 'play it safe' by avoiding the use
of the term 'sovereignty', or even 'sovereign rights' in defining the relation of the
coastal state to the continental shelf.
The United States proposed . . . the deletion of the word 'sovereign' and the substitution of the word 'exclusive'. [I]n introducing the Delegation's proposal, the
U.S. representative made it clear that the U.S. Delegation was opposed to anything which might even remotely cast doubt upon the status of the superjacent
waters and airspace.
Whiteman, Conference on the Law of the Sea: Convention on the Continental Shelf, 52
AM. J. INT'L LAW 629, 636 (1958).

3. The rights of the coastal State over the continental shelf do not depend
on occupation, effective or notional, or on any express proclamation.
4. The natural resources referred to in these articles consist of the mineral
and other non-living resources of the seabed and subsoil together with living
organisms belonging to sedentary species, that is to say, organisms which,
at the harvestable stage, either are immobile on or under the seabed or are
unable to move except in constant physical contact with the seabed or the
subsoil.15
Thus, with adequate safeguards expressly set out in the Convention, the United States acceded to the use of the adjective "sovereign". It is submitted that "sovereign rights" are at least as indicative of real 1property rights as is the language of the Truman
Proclamation. 6
Perhaps the leading judicial analysis of the continental shelf doctrine occurred when the Convention, which came into force on June
10, 1964, was considered in 1969 by the International Court of Justice in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases.17 Although the issue
before the Court was the delimitation of the continental shelf boundaries of several countries surrounding the North Sea, the judgment
addressed the nature of the rights to be exercised within those
18
boundaries.
15. Convention on the Continental Shelf, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S.
No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311.
16. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. In a 1956 article, D.P. O'Connell
considered whether a claim to sovereignty over the shelf is equivalent to a claim to property in it. He stated:
When, by design, a claim is tantamount to an exercise of the incidents of ownership, it seems highly artificial to erect a distinction between imperium and dominium, and, indeed, no such distinction is in fact erected either in theory or
practice. The bulk of opinion favours the view, for example, that sovereignty
over the territorial belt imports a proprietary title. .

.

. It seems to be impossi-

ble to distinguish in strict jurisprudence between the interest a state has in territorial waters, and that which it claims to have in the continental shelf.

O'Connell, Sedentary Fisheries and the Australian Continental Shelf 49 AM. J. OF

185 (1955).
Three of Professor O'Connell's conclusions relate to the nature of the right of a state
to its continental shelf:
4. International law invests the littoral state with the right to claim full sovereignty over the shelf.
7. In general, and unless municipal law otherwise provides, imperium and dominium coalesce in a claim to the continental shelf.
8. A claim to the continental shelf is accordingly effective to appropriate to the
littoral state the mineral deposits of the shelf and all marine organisms that can
be legally assimilated to it.
Id. at 198-200.
17. North Sea Case, 1969 I.C.J. 3.
18. Id. R. Y. Jennings considered some of the implications of the judgment of the
International Court of Justice in a 1969 article:
In seeking the basic principle on which this concept of an area of national jurisdiction over seabed and subsoil rests, the Court in its judgment returns to President Truman's historic Proclamation of September 28, 1945, which, said the
Court, has a "special status" as "the starting point of the positive law on the
subject," in its enunciation of the doctrine that a coastal State has an original,
INT'L LAW
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The judgment established that the application of strict equidistance principles will not result in continental shelf boundaries which
justify the fundamental right of the coastal state in the shelf. The
characterization of continental shelf jurisdiction as an extension of
coastal state sovereignty over its land territory supports the thesis
that continental shelf rights are real property rights.
While cast in language which resembles the qualified profit A.
prendre, the limitation of the shelf rights to the exploration and exploitation of natural resources is not intended to restrict activities
natural and exclusive (in short, a vested) right to the continental shelf off its
shores.
Jennings, The Limits of Continental Shelf Jurisdiction:Some Possible Implications of
the North Sea Case Judgment, 18 INTL & COMP. L.Q. 819, 821 (1969) (citing North
Sea Case, 1969 I.C.J. 3, 32-33).
Jennings then considered the text of the Preamble to the Proclamation and concluded
that the justification for the Proclamation concerned the geological and geographical relationship of fact between the land mass of the coastal state and its continental shelf
resources. Jennings points out the importance of that relationship which was recognized
by the International Court:
It is the same idea of a relationship of fact that is now authoritatively restated
and relied upon by the International Court when it said that the rights of the
coastal State in respect of the area of continental shelf that constitutes a natural
prolongation of its land territory into and under the sea exist ipso facto and ab
initio, by virtue of its sovereignty over the land, and as an extension of it in an
exercise of sovereign rights for the purpose of exploiting its natural resources. In
short, there is here an inherent right.
[T]he continental shelf jurisdiction is not only an appurtenance of the coastal
State but an inalienable appurtenance, which belongs simply by reason of the
State's sovereignty over its land territory, being indeed an extension of it.
Id. at 822 (citing North Sea Case, 1969 I.C.J. 3, 22). Jennings continues:
[T]he quality of appurtenance or prolongation can only be identified by reference to physical fact, making geomorphological or perhaps geological considerations paramount. The Court in its judgment confirms this in no uncertain voice.
The continental shelf, we are told, constitutes a naturalprolongationof its land
territory into and under the sea (emphasis added).
Id.
The institution of the continental shelf has arisen out of the recognition of a
physical fact; and the link between this fact and the law, without which that
institution would never have existed, remains an important element for the application of its legal regime. The continental shelf is, by definition, an area physically extending the territory of most coastal States into a species of platform
which has attracted the attention first of geographers and hydrographers and
then of jurists.
Id. at 823 (citing North Sea Case, 1969 I.C.J. 3, 51).
The appurtenance of the shelf to the countries in front of whose coastlines
where it lies, is therefore a fact, and it can be useful to consider the geology of
that shelf in order to find out whether the direction takes by certain configurational features should influence delimitation because, in certain localities, they
point-up the whole notion of appurtenance of the continental shelf to the State
whose territory it does in fact belong.
Id. at 819.

undertaken with respect to the resources or interests in the resources
themselves. The limitation is intended to prevent dilution of the principle of the freedom of the high seas; so long as these traditional
freedoms are preserved, the coastal state may exercise any right, including in situ ownership, in the natural resources of the continental
shelf which will facilitate their development.
SUBSEQUENT CONDUCT AMONG NATIONS

The decision of the International Court makes it clear that the
rights to the resources of the continental shelf now exist as a matter
of customary international law, developed from the conduct of nations and independent of the Geneva Convention. Accordingly these
rights are recognized without regard to whether or not a particular
coastal state has ratified the 1958 Convention.
The fifteen years subsequent to the North Sea Shelf cases constitute a period during which the basic principles governing the continental shelf were strengthened. The confirmation of Article 2 of the
1958 Geneva Convention, through the virtually identical language of
article 77 of the 1982 Convention, demonstrates the solidity and consistency of the rights a coastal state enjoys under international law in
its continental shelf resources. Furthermore, the characterization of
those rights as real property rights is supported by the provisions ofseveral treaties of petroleum reservoirs which straddle international
boundaries.19 In light of these Conventions, Treaties, and International practices, it is difficult to imagine a consistent theory of
coastal state rights in the natural resources of its continental shelf
which does not admit of substantial rights in the oil and gas in place.
SUBSEQUENT DOMESTIC CONDUCT OF NATIONS

Finally, we turn to the internal treatment by coastal states of the
natural resources of their continental shelves.
19. See Ouorato, Apportionment of an InternationalCommon Petroleum Deposit,
26 INT'L & CoMP. L. Q. 324, 325-26 n.6 (1977). For analysis of cross boundary reservoir
problems, see Gault, The Frigg Gas Field: Exploitation of an International Cross
Boundary Petroleum Field, INT'L J. OF OCEAN AFFAIRS (1979).
In a series of bilateral treaties the North Sea states have developed an approach
which:
I. recognizes a state's interest in the petroleum deposits straddling international
boundaries;
2. recognizes the migratory nature of oil and gas, not by adopting the rule of
capture found in parts of the United States and Canada, but by imposing on the
interested states an obligation to negotiate a joint operating and revenue sharing
agreement under which the deposit will be produced; and
3. in one case, recognizes one state's right to compensation if the neighbor state
unilaterally develops and takes production from the common reservoir.
Ouorato, supra, at 329 n.15.
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United States

As we have seen, the Truman Proclamation is the basis for the
appropriation of shelf resources to the United States. Although international law regards the Proclamation as the starting point for the
development of the modern doctrine of continental shelf rights, the

United States regards it as part of a chain of executive declarations

setting forth national claims. 20 Following the Proclamation, the
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act was enacted in 1953.21 It sets

out the claim of the United States not only to the natural resources
of the shelf but to the seabed and subsoil themselves: "It is hereby
declared to be the policy of the United States that the subsoil and

seabed of the outer Continental Shelf appertain to the United States
and are subject to its ' jurisdiction,
control and power of disposition as
22
provided in this Act.
None of the state-federal offshore jurisdiction cases considered
rights recognized under international law. Neither the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf nor customary usage is cited as any

source of national rights. It is clear, however, that the Executive
Branch of the United States Government had international law in
mind when it framed its complaint against the states of the Eastern

seaboard in April 1969.23 The complaint alleged that:
The United States is now entitled, to the exclusion of the defendant State,
to exercise sovereign rights over the seabed and subsoil underlying the Atlantic Ocean, lying more than three geographical miles seaward from the
ordinary low-water mark and from other limit of inland waters on the coast,
extending seaward to the outer edge of the continental shelf, for the purpose
of exploring the area and exploiting its natural resources.2 '

The United States Supreme Court decided in favor of the federal
20. As Mr. Justice Black, delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court of the
United States in the first of the "state v. federal government contests" for offshore resource jurisdiction stated:
There are innumerable executive declarations to the world of our national
claims to the three mile belt, and more recently to the whole continental shelf
The latest and broadest claim is President Truman's recent proclamation that
the United States regards the natural resources of the subsoil and sea bed of the
continental shelf beneath the high seas but contiguous to the coasts of the
United States as appertaining to the United States, subject to its jurisdiction
and control . .

.

United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 33-34 n.18 (1947).
21. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-43 (1982).
22. Id.
23. United States v. Marine, 420 U.S. 515 (1975).
24. Id. at 517.

government, basing its decision on earlier decisions involving California, Texas, and Louisiana.
While not relying on international law, the United States is
largely responsible for the international law development of the continental shelf principle, and it is clear that United States practice is
consistent with the characterization of the rights to the resources of

the continental shelf as real property rights.
Canada

In the recently decided Hibernia Reference,25 the Supreme Court
of Canada found that the federal government alone exercises the
rights to explore and exploit that portion of the continental shelf off

the coast of Newfoundland where the rich Hibernia oil field has been
discovered. Two passages from the opinion of the court reflect a
fairly narrow interpretation of the continental shelf rights of coastal
states.26
These passages demonstrate that continental shelf rights are not
property rights in the normal sense and are not founded upon the
normal sovereignty which arises through the state's occupation of
dry land. Rather, they arise through the natural but extra-territorial

association with the land mass. This differentiation has important
implications for the jurisdictional claims of the two levels of govern25. 1984 S.C.R. 385 (discussing the seabed and subsoil of the Continental Shelf
offshore Newfoundland).
26. First, in the North Sea Case, the International Court of Justice (the World
Court) referred to the notion of appurtenance: "[T]he right of the coastal State to its
continental shelf areas is based on the sovereignty of the land domain of which the shelf
area is the natural prolongation into and under the sea." Hibernia, 1984 S.C.R. 385,
395-96 (quoting North Sea Case, 1969 I.C.J. 3, 29).
Continental shelf rights arise as an extension of the sovereignty of the coastal state,
but it is an extension in the form of something less than full sovereignty. The World
Court referred to the "title" in the continental shelf and said the shelf may be "deemed"
to be part of the territory of the coastal state in a certain sense. Id. (citing the North Sea
Case, 1969 I.C.J. 3, 31). But in the ordinary meaning of the term, the continental shelf is
not part of coastal state territory. The coastal state cannot "own" the continental shelf as
it can "own" its land territory. The regulation by international law of the uses to which
the continental shelf may be put is simply too extensive to consider the shelf to be part of
the state territory. International law concedes dominion to the state in its land territory,
subject to certain definite restrictions. By contrast, in the continental shelf the limited
rights that international law accords are the sum total of the rights of the coastal state.
Secondly, at international law, then, the continental shelf off Newfoundland is outside
the territory of the nation state of Canada. Because, as a matter of municipal law,
neither Canada nor Newfoundland purports to claim anything more than international
law recognizes, we are here concerned with an area outside the boundaries of either
Newfoundland or Canada. In other words, we are concerned with extra-territorial rights.
Much of the argument in the present case is based on the assumption that continental
shelf rights are proprietary. We do not think continental shelf rights are proprietary in
the ordinary sense. In the words of the 1958 Geneva Convention, they are "sovereign
rights" and they appertain to the coastal state as an extension of rights beyond where its
ordinary sovereignty is exercised. In pith and substance they are an extra-territorial manifestation of, and an incident of, the external sovereignty of a coastal state. Id. at 396.
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ment in the federal system of Canada, where only one level, the federal government, has extra-territorial rights and powers. These excerpts apparently were not intended to characterize continental shelf
rights as proprietary or non-proprietary, but were intended to
demonstrate that if proprietary, their source is not the ordinary territorial source.
If these remarks of the Supreme Court of Canada are interpreted
as an inclination away from the property right characterization, a
similar interpretation may be made of the federal legislation governing offshore petroleum. 7 No complete real property rights to the
oil and gas in situ are conferred by this legislation, though the combined rights do appear similar to the traditional oil and gas lease
rights to search for, remove, and sell hydrocarbons. These rights
(profit A prendre) are characterized in law as limited real property
rights.28
United Kingdom

The United Kingdom neatly avoided characterization of its rights
recognized under international law. The Continental Shelf Act provides: "Any rights exercisable by the United Kingdom outside territorial waters with respect to the seabed and subsoil and their natural
resources, except so far as they are exercisable in relation to coal,
are hereby vested in Her Majesty." Through incorporation by reference to the Petroleum (Production) Act of 1934,0 the Crown may
grant licenses to search, bore, and remove any petroleum beyond the
territorial sea in which the United Kingdom has rights. Professor
Daintith has taken the view that although on land the Crown must
be considered the owner of petroleum in situ, on the continental
shelf the Crown has a lesser interest.31
27. The Canada Oil and Gas Act provides in §§ 9 and 17 that:
9. An exploration agreement confers, with respect to the relevant Canada lands,
the right to explore for and the exclusive right to drill for oil or gas, the exclusive right to develop those Canada lands in order to produce oil or gas and the
exclusive right subject to compliance with the other provisions of this Act, to
obtain a production license.
17. A production licence confers, with respect to the relevant Canada lands, the
exclusive right to produce oil or gas and, subject to section 48 and to the payment of any applicable royalty to Her Majesty in right of Canada, confers title
to the oil and gas so produced. Oil & Gas Act, CAN. REV. STAT. ch. 81 (1982).
28. Berkheiser v. Berkheiser, 1957 S.C.R. 387.
29. Supra note 1.
30. Petroleum (Production) Act, 1934, ch. 36.
31. DAINTITH & WILLOUGHBY, A MANUAL OF UNITED KINGDOM OIL AND GAS
LAW 232 (1977).

Peter Nachant Swan propounds the theory that petroleum in situ

beneath the North Sea is incapable of ownership.3 2 It is submitted
that this view is not accurate and that the views of Professor Daintith, while accurately describing the rights of a licensee under the
1934 and 1964 Acts, do not adequately characterize the more comprehensive rights of ownership of continental shelf resources of the
coastal state.
Other Countries
D. P. O'Connell has characterized as proprietary the right of a
coastal state to the resources of its continental shelf, and the Procla-

mations by the Australian government in 1953 recognized the principle of international law that: "[T]here appertain to a coastal state or
territory sovereign rights over the seabed and subsoil of the continental shelf contiguous to its coast for the purpose of exploring and ex-

ploiting the natural resources of that seabed and subsoil." 33
The attitude of the People's Republic of China toward the rights
of a coastal state in its continental shelf which is referred to as its
economic zone has been expressed as follows: "In the case of an exclusive economic zone, the coastal state mainly enjoys ownership
over the economic resources therein, including living resources and
seabed natural resources .... "3"
More recently, Tang Changxu of the China National Offshore Oil
Corporation related the same philosophy in commenting on the 1982
Regulations on the Exploitation of Offshore Petroleum Resources in
It was the view of the UK Government spokesman [Mr. Peyton] in debates on
the Bill that this term did not confer rights of ownership of petroleum in situ
and other natural resources of the seabed. It would seem, however, that the
rights must be of a proprietary character - otherwise it is hard to understand
how the government can grant an exclusive licence to search for and get offshore
petroleum and why there is no statutory rule prohibiting unauthorized offshore
drilling. The official view of the relationship of the Crown with the resources in
situ would therefore appear to be that it possesses a right akin to that recognized in Pennsylvania and Calif6rnia as 'qualified ownership' or to a profit A
prendre of English law.

Id,
32.

Id.

P. SWAN, OCEAN OIL AND GAs DRILLING AND THE LAW 134 (1979).

Although the licensees may speak of "their" reserve and "their" interests in a
given field, this phraseology is somewhat misleading. They have no rights over
the oil or gas in situ. It is only after the minerals are won and saved, i.e., extracted, that they become an asset of the joint venture and only after they are at
the delivery point that they become the property of any individual participant. It
is not possible to collateralize the reservoir itself . ...

33. O'Connell, supra note 16, at 191 (quoting Australian Commonwealth Acts ch.
p. 2k563, § 56 (1953).
34. Yuan, China's Jurisdictionover its Offshore Petroleum Resources, 12 OCEAN
DEv. & INT'L L.J. 191, 197 (1983) (quoting Chung Yen in a speech to subcommittee II
of the United States Seabed Committee).
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Cooperation with Foreign Enterprises: "All petroleum resources in
the internal waters, territorial sea, and continental shelf of the People's Republic of China and in all sea areas within the limits of national jurisdiction over the maritime resources of the People's '35
Republic of China are owned by the People's Republic of China.
The Norwegian 1963 Petroleum Code36 stipulates that "the right
to submarine natural resources (in the Norwegian sector of the
North Sea) is vested in the State. ' 37 Mr. Ole Lindseth representing
the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy in Oslo, stated that this "basic statement implies that the petroleum belongs to the nation
"38

This survey reveals the differing attitudes of various coastal states
in their domestic offshore petroleum legislation toward the rights
they have acquired in the resources of the continental shelf. While
England and Canada have cautiously refrained from asserting in situ
rights, they are in the minority. Perhaps these countries prefer a system of allocation of petroleum rights based on a contract which is
perhaps more flexible, and more easily and cheaply amended unilaterally, than one based on the certainty of real property rights.
CONCLUSION

If an analysis of the nature of continental shelf rights commences
with a consideration of the text of Article 2(1) of the 1958 Geneva
Convention, words traditionally limiting the scope of similar rights to
contractual licenses or profits Aprendre quickly appear and a narrow
view of the continental shelf rights emerges. This is too literal an
approach, one which does not recognize the different concerns which
international law addresses in setting the extent of continental shelf
rights.
The correct approach is first to determine the conflicting policies
and interests which the coastal states were and are attempting to
balance. In the case of the rights to continental shelf natural resources, there is the desire of the coastal state to develop petroleum
and other mineral deposits on the one hand, and the more widespread conviction to maintain the right of free passage through the
35.

Changxu, The Policy and Practice on China's Offshore Petroleum Exploita-

tion in Cooperation with Foreign Enterprises, INT'L ENERGY L. 783, 786 (1984).
36. The Royal Decree of May 31, 1963, and the Provisional Law of June 21, 1963,
of the United Kingdom of Norway.
37. Id.
38. 0. Lindseth, Petroleum Policy and Legal and Contractual Frameworks The Norwegian Case, INT'L ENERGY L. 757, 759 (1984).

water column and air space beyond states territorial waters on the
other.
Protection of high seas freedom has been achieved through express
prohibition of exclusive water column and airspace interests and express prohibition of undue interference with navigation or submarine
cable and pipeline installation. The conflicting interests are therefore
appropriately balanced to permit utilization of the continental shelf.
The characterization of these rights of states in the natural resources
will not affect that balance and may afford the coastal state, its chosen explorers, and the explorers' lenders more effective and more secure rights. If this characterization leads to a more useful system for
development of natural resources of the continental shelf without being detrimental to competing policies, its acceptance should be encouraged as a principle of international law. From the above reviewed authorities, it is clear that the characterization of the rights
of a coastal state to continental shelf natural resources as real property rights is a well-developed doctrine.

